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Abstract 
In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“In my experience, few directors in modern times have seen their interests as 
separate from those of the CEO, who effectively appointed them and, presumably, 
could remove them from future slates of directors submitted to shareholders.” – 
Alan Greenspan at the Stern School of Business, March 26, 2002. 
 
Despite anecdotal evidence and academic studies on the discretionary power of CEOs in 
selecting board of director candidates (e.g., Mace (1971), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)), the financial economics and corporate governance literature 
lack a detailed empirical examination of the influence of CEO effects on a broad range of 
internal corporate governance structures.  Our study addresses this gap by examining for the first 
time the effect of the variation in non-readily measurable personality traits and managerial styles 
of CEOs and board chairs, also known as managerial heterogeneity, on corporate governance. 
Specifically, in this study we investigate the role of managerial heterogeneity in 
explaining board size, board independence, and the CEO-chair duality, which have significant 
influence on financial and strategic corporate decisions. We also examine whether CEO-specific 
heterogeneity can explain the variation across firms in the strength of shareholder rights, which 
are represented in this study by a modified version of the index created by Gompers et al. (2003).  
Additionally, we investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) along with the 
NYSE and Nasdaq new governance regulations approved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 2003 have reduced managerial discretion on governance practices in 
recent years. 
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This study contributes to two streams of the recent financial economics and corporate 
governance literature. First, we complement studies of the effect of managerial characteristics on 
corporate decisions (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham et al. (2011)).  More 
specifically, we add an important dimension to the literature on determinants of board structure.  
Most of the existing finance studies on governance focus on the influence of firm characteristics 
rather than managerial effects on board structure (e.g., Coles et al. (2008) and Link et al. (2009)).   
Second we contribute to studies on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enacted in 2002 
and the new rules approved by the SEC in  2003  on corporate governance and corporate 
decision making (e.g. Link et al. (2009) and Kang et al. (2010)).  Overall, our study contributes 
to the ongoing discussion regarding the influence of CEOs on the internal mechanisms of control 
of their firms.  This debate has continued after SOX and is likely to have a significant effect on 
how new legislative norms and SEC rules will be mandated to address corporate ethical issues. 
Our results show that CEO and chairperson characteristics have a significant effect on the 
variation in board composition (board size and independence) and the decision to join or separate 
the CEO and board chair positions.  The significant effect of CEOs on governance practices 
appears to be mainly attributable to CEOs who also hold the board chair position.  When we 
analyze fixed effects for CEOs who are not board chairs, the addition of CEO fixed effects to our 
regressions does not add explanatory power.  Powerful CEOs who assume also the role of chair 
of the board have the ability to significantly influence governance policies.    We do not find that 
Sarbanes-Oxley and stock exchange governance regulations have significantly decreased the 
effect of CEOs on corporate governance.   
Our finding related to the CEO-chair of the board duality is worth of note.   While in 
many countries the separation of the CEO and chair of the board positions is the norm (e.g. 
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Canada, Australia, Britain and much of continental Europe), the majority of U.S. public 
corporations combine the two positions. Despite pressure from international institutional 
investors to separate the two jobs, the CEO-chair duality is one of the few significant dimensions 
of internal corporate governance that SOX and stock exchange governance new regulations have 
left untouched.1   
Our findings result from an empirical analysis of the effect of the variation in non-readily 
measurable personality traits and managerial styles on corporate governance based on the 
estimation of CEO and chair of the board fixed effects regressions. In assessing the significance 
of managerial heterogeneity on corporate governance, we control for several firm characteristics 
that are related to corporate governance.  Additionally, we investigate whether new governance 
regulations implemented in 2002 and 2003 have reduced managerial discretion on governance 
practices.  Finally, we implement a battery of tests to address concerns about a possible 
endogenous relation between manager-specific characteristics and corporate governance.   
Similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we restrict our sample to firms that switch CEOs 
at least once during the sample period. This sample restriction is required to separate manager 
fixed effects from firm fixed effects because the effect on corporate practices of a CEO who 
never changes firm cannot be estimated separately from his firm fixed effect. In this case, there 
would be perfect correlation between manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Moreover, 
even though it would be statistically possible to extend the analysis to CEOs who manage only 
one firm for only a portion of the entire sample period, that approach would generate the risk of 
obtaining spurious results due to unobservable factors that are correlated with manager fixed 
effects.  To avoid this potential risk, we do not extend our sample to those CEO-firm pairs. 
                                                          
1 “Someone to watch over them”, The Economist, October 15, 2009. 
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Drawing causality between manager-specific heterogeneity and board structure or 
managerial entrenchment requires careful consideration because the relation between governance 
structures and CEO heterogeneity might be spurious. For example, changes in board structures 
and shareholders rights might have been decided previous to the hiring of the new CEO but their 
implementation coincided with the CEO arrival. In this case, if the model specification 
adequately captures the effect of all other relevant exogenous variables, we might not find any 
remaining effect due to managerial heterogeneity. Another possibility is a potentially 
endogenous relation between managerial characteristics and corporate governance affecting the 
results of this study due to, for example, reverse causality.  It could be argued that managerial 
heterogeneity does not explain the variation in corporate governance. Instead, firms optimally 
choose managers who are the best match for their corporate governance structures.  
We use firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant, unobserved characteristics that are 
omitted from our model specification. Moreover, our independent variables control for the 
possibility that firms with CEO-chair duality are particular types of firms along the dimensions 
underscored by the firm characteristics proxied by our control variables.  We also partially 
control for reverse causality by lagging the independent variables by one fiscal year. We then 
address concerns about endogeneity more thoroughly in two additional ways. First, in similar 
vein to Richardson et al. (2003), we examine changes in governance structures for CEOs and 
chairs with tenures of at least two years.  We essentially focus on those executives who might 
have an improved ability to influence the governance policy variables due to longer tenure.  
Second, we adopt the Bertrand and Schoar's (2003) residual regressions and placebo method.   
Our second robustness test consists of a parametric analysis based on residual regression 
to examine the persistence of managerial effects on governance.  We regress the executive’s 
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average residual in his second firm on his average residual in the first firm.  We find a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between a CEO or chair residual in his last job and his 
residual in his first job for the majority of our governance variables.  We then regress pre-
appointment residuals, which assume that each manager in our sample joins his second firm 
three years before and leaves it on the actual appointment date, on the true average residuals in 
the first firm.  The placebo results are not significant.  Overall, the evidence offered by our 
robustness tests suggests that endogeneity is not driving the findings of this study. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews prior related 
literature and develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 describes our sample selection procedure and 
provides descriptive statistics for our sample.  Section 4 presents our multivariate results.  
Section 5 discusses our robustness tests.  Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature and hypotheses development 
The variation in managers’ unobservable characteristics, i.e. heterogeneity due to 
different personality traits and managerial styles, has a significant effect on a wide range of 
corporate policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed effects are important 
determinants of observed variation in investment, financial, and organizational practices of firms.  
According to the authors, these effects are especially important in decisions related to 
acquisitions, diversifications, dividend policy, interest coverage, and cost-cutting initiatives.  
Richardson et al. (2003) examine whether individual board members’ preferences or skills are 
reflected in corporate policy choices and find that director fixed effects also appear to explain 
variation in firms’ governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policies.  Frank and Goyal 
(2009) show that managerial behavior dominates conventional factors in their ability to account 
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for cross-sectional differences in leverage.  Finally, Graham et al. (2011) examine the relation 
between manager heterogeneity and executive compensation and provide evidence that 
managerial fixed effects have a significant role in the level of executive compensation. The 
authors argue that ignoring these effects could result in biased coefficients when estimating the 
compensation equation. The methodology allowed the authors to estimated managerial fixed 
effects not only for managers who change firms but also for some managers who do not. 
Academic and anecdotal sources suggest that the CEO and the chair of the board play an 
important role in the processes that direct and control their organizations. One important issue in 
corporate governance research is the extent to which CEOs influence the board of directors, who 
should monitor the firm's executives but are unlikely to challenge the power and authority of 
those who are often responsible for their nominations to the board. Mace (1971), a board director 
himself, states that executives “determine in large part what the board of directors does or does 
not do” and mentions that other authors have also noted this relationship (e.g., Berle and Means 
(1932), Mason (1958), and Galbraith (1967)). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) examine the 
relation between board effectiveness and the process of director choice.  They argue that board 
independence is determined from negotiations over the balance of power. Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) show that independent directors are less likely to effectively monitor executives 
when the CEO is involved in the director selection. Florou (2005) find a significant relation 
between chair removal and CEO dismissal in the U.K. She suggests that the replacement of the 
chair of the board in these cases enables subsequent governance restructuring, which requires 
new perspectives and abilities. More recently, Boone et al. (2007) present evidence consistent 
with the board independence resulting from a negotiation between the CEO and the board of 
directors.  
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CEOs’ and chairs’ influence on the nomination process and board independence is, 
however, just one instance of their influence on the design of a firm’s governance structures.  
CEOs can affect other dimensions of internal mechanisms of control such as board size, CEO-
chair duality, and provisions that restrict shareholder rights.  For example, Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that smaller boards are more efficient at reducing agency costs 
because of coordination and process problems associated with a larger number of directors. 
Yermack (1996) provide empirical evidence that small boards are more effective in monitoring 
managers and more likely to fire poor performing CEOs. Goyal and Park (2002) present 
evidence that CEOs are more likely to be replaced due to poor performance if the CEO is not the 
chairman of the board. If poor performing CEOs are less likely to be replaced by larger boards 
and when they are chair of the board of directors, we should see evidence of a significant relation 
between top executives’ managerial heterogeneity and relevant corporate governance structures. 
Therefore, we present our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: CEO and chair heterogeneity explains a significant share of the variation in 
governance structures, even after controlling for firm characteristics.  
 
For many years, market participants and institutions have been pressuring U.S. regulators 
to separate the titles of CEO and chair of the board of directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue 
that concentration of the management and control decisions under the same person reduces the 
effectiveness of supervision by the board of directors. Jensen (1993) argues that CEOs cannot 
oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating their company’s managers 
apart from personal interests. Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al. (2002) show that CEOs receive 
higher compensation when they are also board chairs. Felton (2004a) indicates that, for directors 
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and institutional investors, the separation between the roles of chairman and CEO is the most 
important item to be discussed since the passage of SOX. And Felton (2004b) suggests that the 
separation of the two titles improves corporate governance and reduce the risk of corporate 
fraud.  Adams et al. (2005) provide evidence that firm performance is more variable when CEOs 
are more powerful and have greater influence on the company’s decision-making process.  We 
state our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: CEOs who also hold the chair of the board position have larger discretionary 
power on governance structures.  
 
Following a series of accounting scandals, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) in July 2002 to improve financial disclosure and strengthen internal governance 
mechanisms for all U.S. public companies. SOX placed additional responsibility on senior 
executives for the accuracy and completeness of financial reports with more severe penalties for 
corporate fraud. In November 2003, the NYSE and the Nasdaq implemented new rules approved 
by the SEC establishing a stricter definition for independent directors and requiring a majority of 
directors on listed companies' boards to satisfy that definition. These rules also require that the 
audit, compensation, and nominating committees must consist of only independent directors. 
SOX and these stock exchange reforms have had important consequences.  Link et al. 
(2009) examine board structure trends and find that the passage of SOX accelerated the already 
existing trend towards more independent boards while reversed the previous trend towards 
smaller boards. Post-SOX, board committees meet more often, and directors are more likely to 
be lawyers, consultants, financial experts, and retired executives. SOX and the exchange reforms 
have also had unintended consequences. Bargeron et al. (2010) show that risk-taking by 
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managers has significantly decreased since SOX and that the magnitude of this decline is related 
to board structure, firm size, and R&D expenditures.  Kang et al. (2010) find robust evidence that 
managers adopted a more cautious attitude toward corporate investment by using a higher 
discount rate after the passage of SOX.  The authors also find that the effects of SOX are even 
more significant for well-governed firms with a credit rating. Since SOX and the new regulations 
are intended, among other things, to reduce managerial control rent and align managers' and 
shareholders' interests, our third and final hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 3: Governance reforms have reduced the effect of managerial characteristics on 
corporate governance.  
 
3.  Sample and descriptive analysis 
3.1  Sample Selection 
Our sample combines data on the identity of CEOs and board chairpersons, consolidated 
financial accounting data, stock-related data, and corporate governance data.  We compile our 
manager-firm panel data sample as follows. The sample selection starts with all firms in the 
RiskMetrics, formerly known as Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), database for 
the calendar years between 1996 and 2009.  From the RiskMetrics Directors dataset, for each 
firm-year observation we obtain information regarding board size and number of independent 
directors. Since RiskMetrics’ employment title variable does not necessarily indicates that the 
director has that title in the firm, CEO and chairperson information is hand-collected by 
reviewing proxy statements posted on the SEC's Edgar filings database with meeting dates 
corresponding to the dates provided by RiskMetrics. 
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Board composition data is then merged with the annual Compustat and CRSP databases to 
obtain financial accounting and stock information to generate the other independent variables 
that previous studies have found related to corporate governance characteristics. These variables 
are the firm’s market value of equity, market-to-book ratio, free cash flow scaled by total assets, 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous fiscal year, annual industry-
adjusted earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets and averaged over a two-year 
period, long-term debt divided by total assets, the number of business segments, and firm age, 
defined as the number of years since the stock first appears in CRSP.   
From the RiskMetrics Governance dataset, formerly known as the IRRC Takeover Defense 
database, we obtain information regarding 24 state, charter and bylaw provisions that limit 
shareholder rights from 1996 to 2006.  We then construct a modified version of the Gompers et 
al.'s (2003) governance index (G-index). We exclude from the original index six provisions that 
depend on the laws of the state of incorporation of the firm and that, therefore, are less subject to 
managerial discretion (i.e. business combination, control-share acquisition and cash-out, 
directors’ duties, fair-price and antigreenmail laws). The modified version of the index includes, 
therefore, 18 of the 24 G-index provisions.  
While the majority of our multivariate tests make use of the entire sample spanning from 
1996 to 2009, the regressions with the modified G-index as the dependent variable are based on 
observations from 1996 to 2006 due to a modification in how Riskmetrics accounts for 
shareholder provisions. Before 2007, RiskMetrics used the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) as data source. Currently, instead, it uses data from the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) collection system. This change has a significant impact on RiskMetrics data and 
makes the most recent period not directly comparable to previous years. 
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our samples.  As shown in Panel A, our CEO 
sample consists of 140 CEOs who switch firms at least once during our sample period.  The great 
majority (133) switched firms only once.  Six CEOs managed three companies and one CEO 
managed four different firms between 1996 and 2009.  The chairperson sample consists of 249 
chairpersons.  Most of the board chairs chaired the boards of two firms (224), 23 chairpersons 
chaired three boards, one chaired four, and one presided over six different boards.  As shown in 
panel B, the CEO sample consists of 266 unique firms while the chairman sample consists of 480 
firms. Overall, our CEO sample consists of 842 CEO-year observations and our chairman sample 
consists of 1,772 chair-year observations. 
Several recent studies show a significant relation between firm characteristics and 
internal corporate governance systems.  Corporate boards tend to increase in size and add more 
outsiders as operations of a firm expand (Boone et al. (2007)).  Large firms have large boards 
with more outside directors (Linck et al. (2008)).  More complex firms (i.e., larger, more 
diversified firms with higher leverage)  benefit from larger boards (Coles et al. (2008)). 
Therefore, we include several firm-level control variables in our analysis.  Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the samples with CEOs who switch firms at least once and with 
chairpersons who were the chair of the board in at least two firms during the sample period.  To 
generate the statistics reported in Table 2, we first calculate firm averages across time and then 
the means, medians and standard deviations of those firm averages.  Panel A of Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for firm-specific control variables that have been found to significantly 
affect governance characteristics by extant studies in corporate governance.  FCF is free cash-
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flow, defined as cash flow from operations minus dividends for preferred and common stocks 
divided by total assets; MVE is the market value of equity, defined as stock price at the end of 
the fiscal year times the number of common shares used to calculate EPS; LTD is long-term debt 
divided by total assets; ADJEBIT is the two-year average of EBIT minus the industry median; 
NSEGS is the number of business segments; STDEV is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the previous fiscal year, and AGE is the firm’s age in years. 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of governance characteristics from which we 
generate the dependent variables in our multivariate tests. Board size is the number of directors 
on the board.  Independents (insiders) refer to the number of independent (insider) directors on 
the board. 2  Ceo&Chair is a binary variable that identifies CEOs who are also the chairperson of 
the board of directors in the same company. The modified G-index includes only 18 of the 24 
provisions that originally constituted Gompers et al.’s (2003) index as 6 components of the G-
index are less subject to managerial discretion. 
 
4.  Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate analysis consists of regressions that include CEO or chairperson 
indicator variables for each executive who is the CEO or the chair of the board for at least two 
different firms during the sample period.  Each of these indicator variables assumes the value of 
one for a firm-year observation when a specific manager acts as CEO or chairperson for that firm 
in a fiscal year. 
Specifically, our multivariate analysis consists of the following regressions:  
yi,t+1 = g(Xit + t + i + j) + it,      (1) 
                                                          
2 RiskMetrics classifies directors as insiders, affiliated outsiders, and independents. 
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where g(.) is the conditional mean function. Here g(x) = x for the linear model and g(x) = 
exp(x)/[1 + exp(x)] for the logit model. The dependent variable, yi,t+1, is one of the corporate 
governance variables (i.e., board size, proportion of independent directors, CEO/chairperson 
duality, and the modified G-index), Xit is a vector of time-varying firm level characteristics, t 
are year fixed effects, i are firm fixed effects, and it is the error term. j are the fixed effects for 
the CEO or, alternatively, for the chairperson of the board.  We estimate conditional fixed effects 
logit regressions for CEO/chairperson duality and linear fixed effects regressions for all the other 
dependent variables.  In order to statistically assess the incremental effect of manager-specific 
effects over firm characteristics on corporate governance practices, we generate F-statistics and 
chi-square statistics from tests of the joint significance of CEO and chairperson fixed effects to 
test the null hypothesis that all the manager fixed effects are zero.  We also compare the adjusted 
and pseudo R2 of regression specifications with and without manager fixed effects. We estimate 
regression (1) with firm fixed effects but without CEO or chairperson fixed effects, and then with 
both firm effects and CEO (or chairperson) effects.   
Table 3 presents the results of our fixed effects regressions.  In addition to firm fixed 
effects, we control for several control variables that the extant literature has found related to 
corporate governance characteristics (e.g.,  Linck et al. (2008)). 
Panel A shows that CEOs have a significant effect on all of the governance 
characteristics under examination.  In the regression in which board independence is the 
dependent variable, CEO fixed effects are significant at the 1% level over the control variables, 
year, and firm effects.  CEO characteristics have also a significant effect on board size and an 
even stronger effect on the decision to join or separate the chairperson and CEO positions.  The 
introduction of CEO fixed effects in the model drastically increases the pseudo R2, suggesting 
14 
 
that CEOs have large discretionary power on the decision to assume the chairmanship of the 
board of directors of their firms.  Finally, the results of the modified governance index regression 
show a significant effect of CEO characteristics on the adoption of corporate bylaws.  This result 
is worthy of note considering that previous papers have documented a lack of significant changes 
in governance shareholder provisions over time at the firm level.3  
Panel B presents the chairperson fixed effects regressions results.  Chairperson 
characteristics have a significant effect on board independence, board size, and CEO-chair 
duality at the 1% level. In the regression in which the modified G-index is the dependent 
variable, chairperson effects are significant at the 5%. Overall, the results of Table 3 show that 
both CEOs and chairpersons of the board have a significant influence on the governance of their 
firms. Unreported coefficients on the control variables have sign and significance consistent with 
the literature.4 
In Table 4 we partition our sample into two sub-periods: before and after the ratification 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (pre- and post-SOX, respectively). SOX and the governance rules 
introduced by the NYSE and Nasdaq at approximately the same time required a majority of 
independent directors on the board and aimed to limit the power of the CEO on board decisions 
by, among other things, requiring full independence of audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees.  By partitioning the sample into these two periods, we are able to investigate if new 
governance regulations enacted by the NYSE and Nasdaq in 2003 along with SOX have reduced 
the managerial effect on corporate governance practices. 
                                                          
3 We replicate the G-Index regressions using the whole G-Index consisting of all 24 provisions, which includes six 
state provisions.  The “full” G-Index results are very similar to the modified G-Index results of Table 3 with the 
exception of the magnitude of the p-values.  Including the six state provisions slightly reduces the significance of the 
executive fixed effects.  Due to the difficulty for executives to opt out of state provisions, this outcome is not 
surprising.  
4 Tables containing coefficients and significance of the control variables are available upon request. 
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Panel A shows that CEO effects on board independence, board size and CEO-chair 
duality are significant post-SOX while the CEO effects in the CEO-chair duality and modified 
G-index regressions are significant pre-SOX. Panel B shows that chairperson effects on board 
independence and CEO-chair duality are significant post-SOX while the effects in board size, 
CEO-chair duality and modified G-index regressions are significant pre-SOX. It is important to 
note that fixed effects regressions with year, firm and manager fixed effects require a large 
amount of degrees of freedom, and that reducing the sample period and sample size by about half 
strongly reduced the power of our tests.  However, the results presented in Table 4 provide 
evidence that, at a minimum, SOX did not reduce the effect of CEO heterogeneity on governance 
and are consistent with those presented in papers that question the effectiveness of that act. 
Ghosh et al. (2010), for example, find no evidence that earnings management declined following 
SOX. 
CEOs who also chair the board of their own companies hold more decision-making 
power  (Adams et al. (2005)) and could possibly have more discretional power on modifying 
firm’s governance.  In Panel A of Table 5, we examine this conjecture by restricting our analysis 
to CEOs who are also chair of  the board for at least one of the two firms they lead during the 
sample.  Consistent with our conjecture, we find that these CEOs have a significant effect on 
board size, board independence, and G-index despite the lower power of these tests due to the 
smaller sample size.  The “powerful CEO” effects are significant at the 1% level for board 
independence and G-index and at the 10% level for board size. 
Conversely, panel B of Table 5 shows that when we restrict our sample to CEOs who do 
not hold the board chairmanship for at least one of the two firms they lead during the sample 
period, the effect is not significant for board independence and board size.  Overall, the results in 
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panel A and B of Table 5 present strong evidence that CEOs that are also board chairpersons 
have a significantly stronger influence on the design of the internal governance of their own 
firms.5 
The significant results of our main chair fixed effects regressions presented in panel B of 
Table 3 could be caused by those chairpersons who are also CEOs of the same firm.  In order to 
verify that our chair fixed effects results are not driven by chairpersons who are also CEOs, we 
re-estimate the chair fixed effects regressions for the subsample of chairpersons that do not hold 
the CEO position for the firms for which they chair the board during our sample period (“pure 
chairs”).  Panel C of Table 5 presents the results for chairperson of these fixed effects 
regressions.  The chair effects results hold for board size and G-index when considering this sub-
sample, confirming that our chair effect results are not exclusively driven by executives who 
hold both the chairpersons and CEO position. 
 
5.  Robustness Tests 
The significant relation between managerial heterogeneity and governance structure 
documented in the previous section does not dispel concerns about spurious correlation and 
endogeneity.  We may observe a spurious correlation between the response and the explanatory 
variable if some firm-specific characteristics that affect both are not present in the specification. 
For example, changes in board structures and shareholders rights might have been decided and a 
new CEO hired due to the same unobserved factors. Therefore, we use fixed effects estimations 
to control for firm-specific, unobserved characteristics. As argued by Chi (2005), fixed effects 
                                                          
5 The samples of Panel A and B of Table 5 overlap for a subset of CEOs.  Both samples include CEOs that are board 
chairpersons for only one of the two firms they lead during the sample period. If anything, the overlap might bias the 
results against finding a difference in the significance of the F-stats for the two samples. 
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models effectively address this source of bias if the characteristic that is omitted from the model 
specification is time-invariant or at most slow moving. Another possibility is an endogenous 
relation affecting the results of this study. Rather than executives implementing governance 
changes, for example, firms might optimally choose managers who are the best match for their 
corporate governance structures.  We partially control for this possible issue in the main 
regressions by lagging the independent variables by one year.  
 In this section, we address these concerns more thoroughly in two additional ways.  We 
first consider two subsamples of CEOs (chairs) who worked in each of their firms for at least two 
years.  In a similar vein to Richardson et al. (2003), we essentially focus on those executives who 
might have an improved ability to influence the governance policy variables due to a longer 
tenure.  In one subsample we exclude the observations corresponding to the first year of each 
tenure, in the second subsample we exclude the observations corresponding to the last year of 
each tenure. CEOs and chairs are likely to actively implement changes after at least one year 
since they assume their position.  If CEOs and chairs are going to actively change governance 
policies, the managerial fixed effects for the sample without the first year should be stronger than 
for the sample that excludes the last year of tenure.  If, instead, the results of this study are due to 
the effect of unobserved factors or firms matching their new governance policies with CEOs and 
chairs with similar philosophies, there should not be any difference in the significance of any of 
the fixed effects when either excluding the first year or last year of tenure from the sample.   
 Table 6, Panel A, presents the results of this robustness test for CEO effects. For the 
regressions that have board independence and modified G-index as dependent variables, CEO 
effects are significant at lower significance levels when the first year is excluded than they are 
when the last year is excluded. While CEO effects are never significant for board size 
18 
 
regressions, they are significant at the 1% level for the CEO-chair duality regressions excluding 
either the first or the last year. Adjusted R2 and pseudo R2 of regression specifications with CEO 
fixed effects are always higher when the first tenure year is excluded.  
Panel B presents the results for chair effects. When board independence is the dependent 
variable and the first year of tenure is excluded, chair effects are significant at higher, not lower, 
significance levels. Chair effects are only significant for board size and CEO-chair duality 
regressions when the first year is excluded and are never significant for the modified G-index 
regressions. Adjusted R2 is the same for board characteristics regression specifications with chair 
fixed effects when either the first or the last year is excluded. Adjusted R2 and pseudo R2 are 
higher for the modified G-index and the CEO-chair duality regressions, respectively, when the 
first year is excluded.  Since these results provide only partial evidence inconsistent with an 
endogenous relation between managerial heterogeneity and governance practices, we conduct a 
second robustness test to reduce our concerns. 
Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003), our next robustness test consists of a parametric 
analysis based on residual regression to examine the persistence of managerial effects on 
governance.  We first estimate firm-year residuals by regressing the governance variables of 
interest on the time-varying firm controls and year fixed effects. We then average these annual 
residuals for each CEO-firm or chair-firm cluster. This executive’s average residual essentially 
represents the unobservable executive specific effects on governance characteristics for each 
executive-firm pair.  In the last step of this test, we regress the executive’s average residual in his 
second firm on his average residual in the first firm.  We report the results in the “real data” 
columns of Table 7.  We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between a CEO 
or chair residual in his last job and his residual in his first job for all the governance variables, 
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with the sole exception of the modified G-index for CEOs.  The results of this test present strong 
evidence consistent with a persistence of the CEO and chair effects across all firms which they 
are employed in after controlling for firm characteristics and time effects.  However, this test 
does not univocally imply an active influence of managers on their companies. Suppose a model 
of the world where managers have no specific skills or styles but boards mistakenly believe 
otherwise. The CEOs or the chairs in our sample could coincidentally be appointed by two firms 
with similar governance policies. 
To dispel this concern we analyze the precise timing of the observed changes in corporate 
policies.  If CEOs and board chairs actively shape internal corporate governance, the governance 
changes will only take place after the appointment.  We implement a placebo method similar to 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003).  We calculate average residuals in governance structures as 
described above with the exception of assuming that each manager in our data set joins his 
second firm three years prior to the actual appointment date and leaves that firm just prior of the 
actual appointment date.6 We then regress these average pre-appointment residuals for the 
second firm on the true average residuals for the first firm.  If the new CEO or chairperson is 
personally responsible for the change in governance policies instead of been coincidentally 
appointed by a firm with similar policies as the previous one, the “placebo” regressions should 
have lower adjusted R2 than the “real” residual regressions. We present the results in the 
“placebo data” columns of Table 7.  Contrary to the “real data” coefficients, the “placebo data” 
coefficients are not statistically significant and the regressions’ adjusted R2 are consistently 
lower and for the most part very close to zero.  These results provide strong evidence confirming 
that the changes in corporate governance take place when the new CEO or chair arrives at the 
                                                          
6 For instance, if a CEO joins his second firm (firm B) in 2004, we calculate pre-appointment residuals using firm B 
data for the 2001-2003 period when, in reality, a different CEO was at the helm of the firm. 
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new company rather than taking place independently from the executive’s arrival. 7 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Several studies examine how firm and institutional characteristics affect corporate 
governance structure and policies.  However, little is known empirically in regards to the 
influence of executive personality traits and managerial styles (i.e., managerial heterogeneity) on 
corporate governance.  In this study we investigate if CEO and board chair fixed effects can 
explain the variation in corporate governance characteristics over firm characteristics and firm 
effects.  We find that both CEO and board chair fixed effects are significant determinants of 
board structure (board size and independence) and CEO-chair duality.  Powerful CEOs, those 
executives who hold both the CEO and chair of the board positions, have the strongest effect on 
governance policies.    
Our results suggest that changes in governance characteristics take place after the new 
CEO or chair arrives in the new company. While they may be interpreted as evidence of the 
influence of managerial heterogeneity on governance characteristics, an alternative interpretation 
is that a company becomes attractive to managers after announcing or contemplating changes in 
governance structures that are consistent with their managerial style.8 Under either interpretation, 
our results support the notion that CEO and chairperson heterogeneity significantly explains 
some of the variation in corporate governance. 
We also examine if the managerial effects have a diminished significance for the period 
                                                          
7 We also calculate the variation in governance measures during the tenure of the CEOs/chairs in our sample and 
compare them with the changes during the tenure of the previous CEOs/chairs. We find significantly greater changes 
in governance variables during the tenure of CEOs/chairs in our sample. The results of this test provide additional 
evidence that changes in corporate governance take place when the new CEO or chair arrives. 
8 We thank the referee for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 
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following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley act, and NYSE and Nasdaq governance 
regulations.  These regulations had the objective, among others, of reducing the CEO influence 
on board decisions to improve board monitoring and internal governance practices.  The 
evidence presented in this study suggests that CEOs did not experience a reduction in their 
influence on board composition after the enactment of these regulations. 
While our study shows that CEO and board chair fixed effects are statistically significant 
determinants of certain corporate governance choices,  the exact channels through which 
managerial styles affect governance remain an unaddressed issue. This relation possibly reflects 
differences in managers’ specific characteristics and abilities, such as leadership, personal 
intellectual, motivational, and interpersonal traits as suggested by Kaplan et al. (2012).  
Governance changes may result either from managers’ imposition or from firms choices based 
on their managerial styles. We believe that this and other unanswered questions that arise from 
our results represent interesting areas for future theoretical and empirical research. 
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Table 1 
Number of Firms and Executives in the Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the number of CEOs, chairpersons, and firms in our sample. 
Panel A shows how many executives vested the role of CEOs or chairpersons in at least two different 
firms during our sample period (1996-2009).  Panel B shows the number of sample firms with one CEO 
or chairperson, two different CEOs or chairpersons, or three different CEOs or chairpersons in our sample 
between 1996 and 2009. 
         
   
   
  
   
   
   
    
   
Panel B: Number of firms per number of executives 
 n. of CEOs n. of firms  n. of chairs n. of firms 
 1 246  1 433 
 2 18  2 47 
  3 2  3 0 
Total   266     480 
        
          
Panel A: Number of executives per number of firms 
 n. of firms n. of CEOs n. of chairs 
 2 133 224 
 3 6 23 
 4 1 1 
 5 0 0 
 6 0 1 
Total   140 249 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents means, medians and standard deviations of firm and governance characteristics for the 
CEO sample and the chair sample.  The statistics reported in this table refer to firm averages across time. 
The sample period goes from 1996 to 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A; Firm Characteristics 
 CEO Sample  Chair Sample 
 Mean Median St Dev  Mean Median St Dev 
FCF 0.0772 0.0706 0.0782  0.0771 0.0748 0.0723 
MVE 9,606  2,264 20,464  8,860  2,406 18,965 
MTB 3.147 2.130 3.201  3.012 2.252 2.556 
LTD 0.1995 0.1770 0.1722  0.2220 0.1982 0.1708 
ADJEBIT 0.0548 0.0282 0.0993  0.0550 0.0321 0.0915 
NSEGS 2.33 2.00 1.52  2.32 2.00 1.39 
STDEV 0.1206 0.1055 0.0648  0.1147 0.1019 0.0574 
AGE 22.709 16 20.726  21.107 14 19.837 
Panel B: Governance Characteristics 
 CEO Sample  Chair Sample 
 Mean Median St Dev  Mean Median St Dev 
board size 9.86 9.00 2.96  9.83 9.50 2.90 
independents 6.54 6 2.72  6.58 6 2.61 
insiders 1.83 2 1.00  1.76 1.50 1.03 
CEO&Chair 0.66 . 0.44  0.49 . 0.46 
Modified G-index 7.59 8 2.21   7.43 7.5 2.27 
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Table 3 
CEO and Chair Fixed Effects Regressions 
This table presents results from fixed effects panel regressions. Panel A presents CEO fixed effects 
regressions on the CEO sample.  Panel B presents chairperson fixed effects regressions on the chairperson 
sample.  The sample spans from 1996 to 2009 with the exception of the Modified G-index regressions for 
which the sample spans from 1996 to 2006 due to data availability. The independent variables of the 
regressions include FCF, ln(MVE), MTB, LTD, ADJEBIT, nsegs, stdev, ln(1+age). The fixed effects are 
year and firm in column 3 and year, firm, and CEO (in panel A) or chairman (in Panel B) in column 4.  
Reported are the F-tests for the joint significance of the CEO (or chair) fixed effects. For each F-test we 
report the value of the F-statistic and the p-value. 
 
Panel A: CEO Effects on Governance Policies  
        
    Year 
and firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
    
Board Independence 
F-stat  2.21 (0.009) 
Adj R2 0.88 0.90 
    
Board Size 
F-stat  1.58 (0.080) 
Adj R2 0.88 0.89 
    
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-square  222.38 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.82 
    
Modified G-index 
F-stat  2.35 (0.015) 
Adj R2 0.96 0.97 
    
Panel B: Chairperson Effects on Governance Policies 
    
    Year 
and firm 
effects 
Chair effects 
    
Board Independence 
F-stat  2.06 (0.002) 
Adj R2 0.86 0.87 
    
Board Size 
F-stat  1.81 (0.008) 
Adj R2 0.85 0.86 
    
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-square  757.78 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.80 
    
Modified G-index 
F-stat  1.95 (0.032) 
Adj R2 0.94 0.95 
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Table 4 
CEO and Chair Fixed Effects Regressions pre- and post-SOX 
This table presents results from fixed effects panel regressions for 1996-2002 (pre-SOX period) and 2003-
2009 (post-SOX period). Panel A presents CEO fixed effects regressions on the CEO sample.  Panel B 
presents chairperson fixed effects regressions on the chairperson sample.  The independent variables of 
the regressions include FCF, ln(MVE), MTB, LTD, ADJEBIT, nsegs, stdev, ln(1+age).. The fixed effects 
are year and firm in columns 3 and 5; and year, firm, and CEO (in panel A) or chairperson (in Panel B) in 
columns 4 and 6.  Reported are the F-tests for the joint significance of the CEO (or chair) fixed effects. 
For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic and the p-value. 
 
Panel A: CEO Effects on Governance Policies     
        
    Year and 
firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
 Year and 
firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
     
  1996-2002  2003-2009 
Board Independence 
F-stat  1.24 (0.283)   4.07 (0.002) 
Adj R2 0.92 0.93  0.92 0.93 
       
Board Size 
F-stat  1.38 (0.216)   2.00 (0.069) 
Adj R2 0.92 0.93  0.90 0.91 
       
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-Square  107.40 (0.000)   53.98 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.88  0.26 0.89 
  1996-2002  2003-2006 
Modified G-index 
F-stat  3.19 (0.010)   0.41 (0.746) 
Adj R2 0.96 0.97   0.99 0.99 
       
Panel B: Chairperson Effects on Governance Policies    
        
    Year and 
firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
 Year and 
firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
     
  1996-2002  2003-2009 
Board Independence 
F-stat  1.15 (0.190)   3.07 (0.003) 
Adj R2 0.91 0.91  0.86 0.87 
       
Board Size 
F-stat   (0.054)   0.88 (0.547) 
Adj R2 0.91 0.92  0.87 0.88 
       
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-Square  321.81 (0.000)   126.79 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.55 0.76  0.54 0.82 
  1996-2002  2003-2006 
Modified G-index F-stat  3.06 (0.006)   0.33 (0.802) 
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Adj R2 0.94 0.95   0.98 0.98 
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Table 5 
CEO and Chair Fixed Effects Regressions by Type 
This table presents results from fixed effects panel regressions.  Panel A presents fixed effects for CEOs 
that are also chairperson of their firm’s board for at least one of the two firms they lead during the sample 
period (“Powerful CEO”). Panel B presents fixed effects for CEOs that are not chairperson of their firm’s 
board for at least one of the two firms they lead during the sample period (“Pure CEO”). Panel C presents 
fixed effects for chairpersons that are not CEO of the same firm for at least one of the two firms for which 
they chaired the board during the sample period (“Pure Chair”). The independent variables of the 
regressions include FCF, ln(MVE), MTB, LTD, ADJEBIT, nsegs, stdev, ln(1+age).. The fixed effects are 
year and firm in columns 3; and year, firm, and CEO (or chair) in columns 4.  Reported are the F-tests for 
the joint significance of the CEO (or chair) fixed effects. For each F-test we report the value of the F-
statistic and the p-value. 
 
Panel A: “Powerful CEO” Effects on Governance Policies 
    
    Year and firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
    
Board Independence 
F-stat  3.48 (0.001) 
Adj R2 0.86 0.88 
    
Board Size 
F-stat  1.87 (0.074) 
Adj R2 0.86 0.87 
    
Modified G-index 
F-stat  8.57 (0.000) 
Adj R2 0.82 0.83 
    
Panel B: “Pure CEO” Effects on Governance Policies 
    
    Year and firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
    
Board Independence 
F-stat  0.60 (0.732) 
Adj R2 0.91 0.91 
    
Board Size 
F-stat  1.73 (0.130) 
Adj R2 0.92 0.92 
    
Modified G-index 
F-stat  5.96 (0.000) 
Adj R2 0.98 0.98 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
 
Panel C: “Pure Chair” Effects on Governance Policies 
    
    Year and firm 
effects 
CEO effects 
    
Board Independence 
F-stat  1.20 (0.263) 
Adj R2 0.85 0.85 
    
Board Size 
F-stat  1.54 (0.086) 
Adj R2 0.84 0.85 
    
Modified G-index 
F-stat  3.24 (0.007) 
Adj R2 0.92 0.93 
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Table 6 
Robustness Test – Truncated Sample: First Year versus Last Year Exclusion 
This table presents results from fixed effects panel regressions after either excluding the first year or the 
last year of the CEO (chairperson) tenure in each firm. Panel A presents CEO fixed effects regressions on 
the CEO sample.  Panel B presents chairperson fixed effects regressions on the chairperson sample.  The 
sample spans from 1996 to 2009 with the exception of the Modified G-index regressions for which the 
sample spans from 1996 to 2006 due to data availability. The independent variables of the regressions 
include FCF, ln(MVE), MTB, LTD, ADJEBIT, nsegs, stdev, ln(1+age). In addition to CEO (chair) fixed 
effects the regressions includes also year and firm fixed effects.  We report the F-tests for the joint 
significance of the CEO (or chair) fixed effects. For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic and 
the p-value. 
 
 
Panel A: CEO Effects on Governance Policies  
   
CEO effects 
 
CEO effects 
     
  Excluding  
first year 
 Excluding  
last year    
Board Independence 
F-stat 2.15 (0.032)  2.06 (0.041) 
Adj R2 0.91  0.90 
     
Board Size 
F-stat 1.33 (0.230)  0.98 (0.454) 
Adj R2 0.90  0.89 
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-Square 94.69 (0.000)  94.83 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.99  0.76 
     
Modified G-index 
F-stat 4.40 (0.003)  2.09 (0.087) 
Adj R2 0.98   0.97 
 
     
Panel B: Chairperson Effects on Governance Policies 
    
Chair effects 
 
Chair effects 
     
  Excluding  
first year 
 Excluding 
 last year    
Board Independence 
F-stat 1.90 (0.032)  2.08 (0.022) 
Adj R2 0.87  0.87 
     
Board Size 
F-stat 1.84 (0.039)  1.13 (0.335) 
Adj R2 0.87  0.87 
     
CEO - Chair Duality 
Chi-Square 414.27 (0.000)  77.49 (0.650) 
Pseudo R2 0.75  0.52 
     
Modified G-index F-stat 0.26 (0.603)  0.40 (0.526) 
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Adj R2 0.95   0.94 
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Table 7 
Robustness Test - Persistence of CEO and Chair Effects: Real Data versus Placebo Data 
This table presents results of residual regressions with real data and placebo data. Each entry in the table 
corresponds to a different regression.  For the "real data" regressions we regress average residual in the 
CEO's (chair's) second firm on his average residual in his first firm.  For the "placebo data" regressions 
we regress average residual in his second firm for the three years prior the CEO (chair) joining that firm 
on his true average residual in his first firm. Below each coefficient, we present the p-values in 
parenthesis and the estimated R2 in squared brackets. 
 
 CEOs  Board Chairs 
  Real Data   Placebo Data  Real Data   Placebo Data 
Board Independence 0.280  0.114  0.233  0.233 
 (0.003)  (0.340)  (0.000)  (0.152) 
 [0.11]  [0.01]  [0.10]  [0.05] 
Board Size 0.243  0.072  0.178  0.113 
 (0.006)  (0.536)  (0.014)  (0.579) 
 [0.11]  [0.01]  [0.07]  [0.01] 
CEO - Chair Duality 0.170  -0.041  0.108  -0.001 
 (0.065)  (0.742)  (0.091)  (0.914) 
 [0.07]  [0.00]  [0.07]  [0.00] 
Modified G-index 0.134  0.005  0.202  0.009 
 (0.315)  (0.813)  (0.010)  (0.795) 
  [0.06]   [0.00]   [0.09]   [0.00] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
